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Abstract Security and defence have become the new front lines of the European 
project. The time has come to build a Security and Defence union capable of deliver-
ing security to Europe’s citizens and the wider continent in a challenging international 
environment. it should be based on five qualitative leaps: a security strategy for Europe, 
an institutional revamp, renewed military ambition, integration of defence capabilities 
and a new partnership with naTo. with the forthcoming Global Strategy on Foreign 
and Security Policy, the follow-up ‘white book’–process and the Commission’s defence 
action plan, 2016 offers the strategic sequence necessary for the union to move 
forward.
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Introduction
European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker has an indisputable way with 
words. when, in 2015, he compared the Eu’s foreign and security policy to a ‘bunch of 
chickens’ and called for the establishment of a ‘European army’, he certainly caught the 
attention of his audience. The response in Berlin, where the notion of a European army is 
well established in popular opinion and coalition agreements, was cautiously supportive. 
in London reactions were unsurprisingly dismissive and derisive (despite recent positive 
polls).1 Stockholm’s Carl Bildt (2015) tweeted ‘. . . what about starting with a European air 
force?’, presumably half in earnest, half in jest; whereas from paris, prime Minister Valls 
allegedly quipped, with distinctive French pride and lament, ‘l’armée européenne existe, 
c’est la France’ (Flora et al. 2015).
These reactions capture the current state of European defence. it is no use invoking 
what is actually called for by the treaties, namely the ‘progressive framing of a common 
union defence policy’ (art. 42(2) Treaty on European union). political will and the soli-
darity to act together cannot be written into treaties. To the honest European observer, 
there should be no doubt that the Commission’s vision for the future is not about return-
ing to Clausewitz-era standing armies but rather about building a European security 
architecture capable of facing today’s and tomorrow’s crises (European political Strat-
egy Centre 2015a, 2015b, 2016).2 as matters stand, the ability of the Eu to collectively 
ensure its security and defence is in serious doubt. Situational awareness, prepared-
ness and decision-making capacity, as well as civilian and military instruments to act 
decisively across a broad spectrum of internal and external crises, are all lacking today.
in 2015, Juncker’s stealth attack proved to be in vain. The European Council of June 
2015, initially expected to focus on defence matters, became another non-event in the 
consolidation of European security. Faced with competing priorities, leaders easily let 
the opportunity slip. May they be forgiven—2015 was still an age of relative innocence. 
russian aggression in ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, the slaughter of hundreds of 
thousands in Syria and the spread of islamic State still seemed to most to be distant 
realities. This time around, just a year on, there is time for neither wordplay nor divi-
sions. war, strife and threats that seemed far away have moved into our cities and our 
homes.
This June’s European Council offers a second chance. Just as European leaders in 
the spring of 2012 awakened from their torpor to propose a Banking union to over-
come the eurozone and sovereign debt crisis, the moment has come to build a Security 
and Defence union. it should be based on five qualitative leaps: a collective security 
strategy for Europe, an institutional revamp, a military ambition fit for today’s security 
1 according to a YouGov poll, the British public is surprisingly positive about the idea of an Eu army: 36 % 
support the idea, 29 % are opposed and 36 % were undecided (wells 2015).
2 Just as von Clausewitz (1989) recognised, in his time, that conflict and war do not only play out on the 
military field through acts of force, but also as socio-political phenomena through the economy, technology, 
politics, social forces and psychology.
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challenges, the integration of military capabilities, and a new partnership and sharing of 
roles with naTo.
A collective security strategy for Europe—at 
last?
as terrorist bombs and Kalashnikovs seem to strike at will at the heart of Europe, we 
should need no further convincing that the world around us is changing for the worse—
and that we need to react to it.
The tide of refugees, beyond the humanitarian crisis, is only the most visible expres-
sion of the return of a strategic reality in which cold external winds chill our hearts, put-
ting the safety and cohesiveness of our societies, and of the European project itself, 
under severe stress. For the first time in two decades the west must regroup and reas-
sess, and find the resources for a combined step change in Europe’s two principal 
security organisations. in parallel with naTo’s strategic adaptation expected at the 
warsaw Summit this summer, High representative of the union for Foreign affairs and 
Security policy Federica Mogherini’s forthcoming Global Strategy on Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy must answer above all the question of what to do to deliver more security to 
Europe.3
Security and defence have become the new front lines of the European project. The 
Global Strategy offers the opportunity to consolidate the union as a security commu-
nity on three conditions: it must propose a new narrative on what the union is about; it 
must create a consensus on threats and interests, cementing commitments to solidarity 
between Europe’s nations; and it must give impetus to a reorganisation of the union’s 
collective means to act in the new security environment.
The first condition is to forget yesterday’s mantra of the Eu as a ‘global player’, which 
has been spun out of the Eu’s successive idealistic visions of building peace, then 
enlargement and finally having an international role for the good of all. This last, univer-
salist ’promise does not work for today’s challenges. The union’s much-fabled ‘trans-
formative power’ (Leonard 2005), our capacity to export our values and stability, is, in 
reality, limited. Equally weakened is the belief in ‘effective multilateralism’, which 
became a cornerstone of former High representative Javier Solana’s 2003 security 
strategy (European Council 2003), as a sufficient answer. Let us face it: if we are to 
avoid importing the world’s crises and instability, our own security and defence must 
now become our fundamental priorities.4 what is needed from leaders in June is a com-
3 See High representative of the union for Foreign affairs and Security policy (2015).
4 Mark Leonard went as far as suggesting that self-preservation is now the most pressing demand when 
discussing the renewal of Europe’s security strategy and his own 2005 ‘transformative power’ concept at 
the Eu institute of Security Studies annual Conference ‘Towards an Eu Global Strategy’ on 22 april 2016 
in paris.
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mon strategic narrative that puts collective security at the heart of preoccupations: may 
they therefore choose ‘In defence of Europe’ as the new ‘bumper sticker’ for the union’s 
external action!
The second prerequisite is recognition of the changing realities of collective security. 
Threats come in hybrid forms; through a multiplicity of actors, state and non-state; and 
unfold on a new continuum from global commons, through our extended and immediate 
neighbourhood, to the heart of our homeland. ultimately, diplomacy and crisis manage-
ment abroad is also homeland security. a new strategy must recognise the simultane-
ous need to protect at home, secure in our vicinity and enable and support partners 
to become security providers beyond (Domecq 2016). Delivering security to citizens 
requires the forging of a consensus on shared vital interests and new means to act on 
them, be this in terms of common efforts to track down terrorist networks; securing our 
borders; managing crises in our neighbourhood; or addressing security concerns along 
trade routes, or in cyber- and outer space.
The third condition is acknowledging the new demands on Eu capacity and capabilities 
across the full civilian–military spectrum. a tougher environment raises important ques-
tions, in particular for the Eu’s military ambition and the Common Security and Defence 
policy (CSDp). Years of under-spending is crippling European defence, just as the lack of 
political will and neglect has every so often left the CSDp powerless and immobilised 
(Major and Mölling 2016). The Global Strategy must not only prepare the union for the 
use of force when necessary, it must also make sure that it has the capacity to do so. in a 
world of complex interdependencies, deciding how to ensure Europe’s freedom of action 
and strategic autonomy through own capabilities and a domestic industrial and techno-
logical base becomes ever more vital. The answer lies in new collective commitments to 
defence investment and cooperation. To get there, the Eu will need to follow up on the 
Global Strategy with a security and defence ‘white book’–process for the first time in the 
history of European defence, as recently proposed by Michel Barnier and Dutch and 
French defence ministers. it should carry out a root and branch review of the union’s cri-
sis management framework, military level of ambition and defence capabilities priorities.5
Institutions (and permanent headquarters), yet 
again
at the risk of provocation, institutional issues are at the heart of the matter. as strong 
centripetal forces make their mark in Europe, the union can only renew its capacity to 
act in common in foreign policy and defence if leaders assume strong ownership. This is 
true of the forthcoming Global Strategy, but also goes further: today’s changing security 
landscape highlights the need for iterative processes capable of forming a consensus 
5 The idea of an Eu defence white book has been an ever recurring issue since the 2001 Belgian presi-
dency, but was recently championed again by the Dutch and French defence ministers and Michel Barnier, 
Special adviser to the president of the European Commission, at the informal meeting of defence ministers 
in Luxembourg in September 2015.
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on priorities and strategy. in 2013, Europe’s woes and responses centred on the euro-
zone, in 2014 on russia and ukraine, in 2015 on borders and refugees, in 2016 so far 
on terrorism—who knows what is next? Collective security deliberations must become 
a systematic fixture of the European Council, underpinned by the regularity and stability 
that only institutions can bring.
in principle this is no more than what the treaties provide for: ‘The European Council 
shall regularly assess the threats facing the union in order to enable the union and its 
member states to take effective action’ (art. 222(4) Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European union). in practice, this should go far beyond today’s rather casual and fickle 
exercises. increasingly complex and horizontal crises cannot be adequately met without 
further institutional consolidation of some sort. Should the union one day face a com-
plex crisis, such as wide-scale cyber-attacks or the collapse of critical infrastructure, 
the many uncoordinated crisis platforms across the institutions and 28 member states 
might simply not be up to the task. in an ambitious Security and Defence union, Eu 
institutions would add value in everything from information sharing, intelligence and joint 
contingency planning to decision-making, coordination and the mobilisation of a range 
of operational instruments.
on the civilian side, a novel approach and a new crisis architecture is slowly coming 
to life in response to the refugee crisis through the integrated political Crisis response 
arrangements6 and reinforced operational means, such as the Eu’s Civil protection 
Mechanism and the Emergency assistance instrument for faster crisis response within 
the Eu.7 in reaction to the increasing complexity and permanence of terrorist threats, 
the European Counter Terrorism Centre, set up just last January within Europol, is 
being scaled up to take on a broad spectrum of front-line tasks from information sharing 
and threat assessment to coordination, the fighting of online terrorist content, emer-
gency response and investigation. To take the measure of new hybrid threats, the Com-
mission and the High representative have just proposed the consolidation of European 
(inter-institutional) intelligence in an Eu Fusion Cell, as well as the establishment of cri-
sis protocols between institutions and with member states (European Commission and 
High representative 2016).
Change is on its way, yet what are missing are often the more decisive institutional 
steps, as illustrated by the protracted debate on a permanent operational headquarters 
(oHQ). The threat of vetoes has long loomed large over this aspect of European inte-
gration—so large that established doctrine has almost come to be that the Eu should 
not have full-blown crisis arrangements of its own. now the writing is on the wall. with-
out situational awareness, contingency planning and reaction capacity at the union 
level, whether in terms of strategic communication or other means, the preparedness 
against hybrid threats will remain insufficient. The lack of a permanent oHQ and inte-
grated crisis management platforms leads to basic inefficiencies such as competition 
6 See European Council (2014).
7 See European Commission (2016).
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between different missions and operations, and prevents effective civilian–military strat-
egy and planning, intelligence gathering, exercises, and command and control at the 
union level. Going half-way will always result in half-measures: the Eu must now act 
decisively by establishing an oHQ structure that can address both internal and external 
contingencies.
Looking further ahead, the treaties’ strong commitments to solidarity are at the heart 
of what the Eu as a security organisation should be about. The two key articles, the 
mutual assistance and solidarity clauses, need not remain bilateral and essentially 
unprepared instruments. Taken together and operationalised, they would allow the 
union to be better prepared and united across a continuum of crises, from natural 
disasters, civilian emergencies such as the refugee overflow, and security threats and 
terrorism, to hybrid challenges and defence (European political Strategy Center 2015a; 
Biscop forthcoming). in institutional terms, what the union should be looking at is not 
only mapping the role of each institution and actor but ultimately also the creation of a 
‘European Security Council’ of its own, bringing together senior-level officials from mili-
tary, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement and other bodies to advise at a strategic 
level.
Levelling up military ambitions
The ‘white book’ follow-up process to the Global Strategy—if leaders can agree on a 
mandate in June—offers the union the first significant opportunity since 1999 to set a 
new military level of ambition. Tough questions must be answered: against what threats, 
and with what objectives should we shape our future security and defence instruments? 
How can we address the CSDp’s current operational weaknesses, be it in terms of the 
availability and deployability of military force, solidarity and burden sharing in operations 
or civilian–military complementarity? what degree of autonomy is the CSDp aiming for, 
and what effort in terms of capabilities does that entail?
Lofty targets will not in themselves deliver security. rather than setting new head-
line goals, the priority should be a review of the CSDp objectives, the so-called peters-
berg tasks, to reflect a new reality of merging external and internal threats. in a capable 
union most military missions short of naTo’s collective defence should be within reach. 
This requires a scaling-up of the union’s means to act across a broad spectrum of oper-
ations, from territorial and border security at home to capacity building and expedition-
ary missions abroad.
The petersberg tasks already provide for ‘peace-making’ or higher-intensity missions. 
To a jittery European public and inexperienced institutions Serval-type operations, 
tracking down al-Qaeda in the islamic Maghreb fighters with bullets and bayonets in far-
off Malian mountain ranges, seem unrealistic. Still, in an increasingly fragile environ-
ment, it is in our common European interest (and not just France’s) to shore up fragile 
states, prevent islamist ‘overruns’ and fight terrorism, even in distant africa. The 
demands on Eu crisis management and peace support will only increase, and to remain 
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with the French taxonomy, the CSDp must now gear up to deliver Barkhane- (anti-
insurgent) and Sangaris- (securitisation and stabilisation) type missions of its own.8
For this, Eu crisis management tools also need to be resized. The ‘never-used’ Bat-
tlegroups should be transformed into a truly modular rapid response concept. Supple-
mented with air and sea components, and special forces as necessary, they should 
be available and capable of performing tasks from crisis management and peace sup-
port operations to temporary border missions, disaster relief and the protection of criti-
cal infrastructure. The Eu’s military leadership must be given responsibility, together 
with framework nations, for the pre-identification of multinational forces that meet the 
standards required for different operations over rotations longer than the current six 
months.
national contributions would be compensated for by new guarantees on burden-sharing. 
a strengthened institutional set-up and new financing tools are necessary to facilitate 
force generation and decision-making for all types of Eu missions. The bet must be that 
a common security strategy and the availability of military threat assessments, planning, 
and command and control arrangements will in time go a long way towards facilitating 
the political decision-making that today is wanting. in addition, a dedicated fund or par-
tial Eu budgetisation should cover the deployment cost of missions and, in the case of 
the Battlegroups, also certain standby costs.
These are not the only lessons to be learned from a changing situation. Europe’s sea 
and land borders highlight how civilian and military options must be better integrated. 
The Mediterranean is currently the testing ground for cooperation between different 
maritime functions, from national maritime operators and Eu agencies, such as Fron-
tex, to CSDp and naTo missions. Making progress towards a large-scale integrated 
maritime information system is becoming a matter of urgency, while the proposal for Eu 
border and coastguard capacities should in time lead to more ambitious Eu maritime 
capabilities.
The CSDp make-over must also prepare the Eu to deal effectively with hybrid threats, 
drawing on national means and best practice as well as new institutional capabilities. a 
comprehensive tool-box could range from civilian and military advisory missions and 
exercises to operational support in specific circumstances, such as emergency border 
control; evacuation; or chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear protection. Cyber-
space is another priority domain where the union must go beyond regulatory 
approaches towards capacities in common to face the new reality of digital weaponry 
and commercially and strategically motivated thefts and destruction.9
8 ‘Coalition of the willing’–type operations as provided for under article 44 of the Treaty on European union 
could be an interesting option for the future.
9 an increasing number of articles, such as the Financial Times’s recent in-depth article on iran’s cyber-
capabilities, provide eye-opening accounts of an ongoing revolution in defensive and offensive cyber-capa-
bilities (Jones 2016).
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Last but not least, a revised CSDp must recognise the need to rely on effective part-
nerships for security and development, whether they are with the un, regional and local 
actors on africa’s continent, or with the organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe and naTo in our eastern neighbourhood. Efforts must be directed as a matter 
of priority towards sustaining state functions such as the police, judiciary and military in 
partner countries through so-called capacity building for security and development. 
Today the military dimension of this effort is wide of the mark. Existing tools in the con-
text of both CSDp budgets and development policies must be put to their best use, but 
a dedicated financing instrument linked to or similar to the instrument contributing to 
Stability and peace10 will be needed if the union is serious about stepping up collective 
action for stability.
Jump‑starting the capabilities integration cycle
Executing full-spectrum military interventions requires robust war-fighting capabilities: 
armoured vehicles, attack helicopters, frigates, strategic lift, tanker aircraft, satellite com-
munication, intelligence and so on. By and large Europe has had (or has had access to) 
these capabilities so far, which has provided a sense of enduring security. Yet existing 
technologies and systems are now old, duplication is rife, and investment and collabora-
tive efforts have ground to a halt. not only do we have 23 different light armoured vehi-
cles in Europe today, but, as a renewal of naval capabilities is announced, 7 European 
nations are launching 7 parallel frigate programmes. This ongoing ‘renationalisation’ of 
defence (Keohane 2016) is a race to the bottom that defies all logic.
The days when national sovereignty and security could be assured through national 
means alone are coming to an end. Budgetary constraints, defence inflation, techno-
logical changes and cost escalation (wolf 2015) will force a paradigm shift: member 
states, big and small, and Europe as a whole, must either acquire capabilities through 
cooperation or risk losing them altogether. Still, today the European Defence agency’s 
(EDa) Capability Development plan is ailing due to a lack of common priorities and seri-
ous member state engagement, just as past initiatives, whether the Eu’s pooling and 
Sharing or naTo’s Smart Defence, have delivered only meagre results.
More bite is needed to sustain a new cycle of integration in defence capabilities. The 
upcoming defence ‘white book’ must establish quantitative and qualitative investment 
commitments,11 identify key collaborative capability projects for the coming years and 
connect bottom-up capability efforts with the necessary top-down political steering. a 
European Semester–type process, whereby national and bilateral defence planning and 
procurement priorities are regularly reported to the EDa and discussed by ministers, 
10 See European Commission (2015).
11 These could be based on the naTo wales pledge of increasing defence spending up to 2 % of GDp, 
but the qualitative elements as already enshrined in existing but non-binding EDa benchmarks seem just as 
important. For more information on these see EDa (n.d.).
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should be instituted to achieve more synchronisation. in this, focus should be placed on 
capabilities with the highest operational impact, and on prospects for European cooper-
ation and supply chain integration.
in parallel, Europeans must prepare for formidable shifts in military technology. a 
decade ago military research and technology would have been ahead of civilian 
research and applications by several years. This is no longer the case today, with key 
strategic technologies in aerospace, cyber-technology, robotics and man-to-machine 
interfacing becoming globally available. The uS has announced a new defence inno-
vation initiative—the ‘3rd offset Strategy’—to counter the growing military–technologi-
cal might of China, russia, iran and others. For Europeans, whose own investment in 
military research and development is down by 35 % in just 10 years, this raises serious 
questions and risks a widening technology gap within naTo (Fiott 2016).
if Europeans are to retain the ambition to decide their own security and be a reliable 
partner in naTo then they have no choice but to join this innovation race. There can be 
no enduring military effort or long-term strategic culture without own capabilities and a 
defence industrial–technological base to sustain them. Supporting collaborative efforts 
in capability development and enhanced investment in defence research and technol-
ogy hence stand out as fundamental priorities for the European Defence action plan 
announced by the Commission.
one area of action should be to support greater investment in critical technologies 
through a future defence research programme. The investment of €3.5 billion over 
seven years, as suggested by the European Commission Group of personalities (Group 
of personalities 2016), will add an indispensable ‘fifth player’ to the European research 
and technology effort, and will also serve as a catalyst for member state buy-in in a new 
capability-planning process. Together with the EDa, the Commission can also use its 
wide range of industrial policy tools, from small to medium-sized enterprises and raw 
material policies to certification and standardisation, to support European capability pri-
orities and cooperation.
Last but not least, the Eu should act much more decisively on incentives and financing 
for collaborative defence projects. a major step forward would be to recognise common 
European projects, as opposed to national ‘go-it-alone’ approaches, as structural budg-
etary efforts in the context of the application of the Stability and Growth pact. Specific 
fiscal incentives, beyond the EDa’s current VaT exemption, should also be considered. 
in terms of financing tools, a fresh look must be taken at the European investment Bank 
instruments, including the potential for a next-generation European Fund for Strategic 
investment. The EDa also needs a dedicated bridging capacity or start-up fund to over-
come the lack of synchronisation in national defence budgets that holds back common 
projects today.
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EU–NATO: from Berlin Plus to Brussels Plus!
General de Gaulle reputedly said of naTo that it is ‘the defence of Europe by ameri-
cans’. The question of what Europeans should be able to do together without Uncle 
Sam is as relevant today as then. in his recent ‘Doctrine’ interview in The Atlantic (Gold-
berg 2016), uS president obama made it starkly clear that the uS expects less free-
riding from Europeans in a tougher, multipolar world. Changing realities should also 
prompt a strategic rethink: the spirit of Berlin plus and the old division of labour in which 
naTo carries out territorial and collective defence while the Eu acts as a low-inten-
sity crisis manager abroad, in particular on the african continent, no longer holds true. 
The Eu’s recent exploration of hybrid threats, strongly pushed by the uK, the uS and 
naTo, is just one acknowledgement that in the face of diversifying threats, our collec-
tive security in a broader sense cannot be naTo’s sole appanage.
The final area in which Europeans must collectively step up their efforts is therefore that 
of Eu–naTo relations. Years of mutual suspicion are in the process of being traded in for 
a new partnership, no longer based on the wrong question of ‘what the Eu is not going to 
do’ but on the right one, namely ‘what the Eu should do and how to do it together with 
NATO’. naTo and the Eu are complementary security organisations on a continent that 
needs more, not fewer efforts. Collective territorial defence, pre-positioning, air policing 
and reassurance measures are not in themselves enough. The broader concept of collec-
tive security must be addressed by articulating the two organisations’ comparative advan-
tages, avoiding duplication as well as limiting preconceptions of role-sharing.12
This summer’s back-to-back European Council and naTo summits must be seized 
upon to establish a roadmap to fully develop Eu–naTo synergies. in the area of hybrid 
threats common protocols and even joint hybrid teams should be envisaged, while fully 
respecting each organisation’s decision-making autonomy. Defence capacity building, 
maritime situational awareness, exercises and cyber-defence are further areas to be 
considered for reinforced cooperation (Stoltenberg 2016).
More significantly and looking ahead to a potential deal on the unification of Cyprus, 
the Eu and naTo should not only deepen information exchange but could also break 
new ground in the sharing of operational means, such as rapid reaction instruments. in 
an ideal partnership between the two organisations, the separate Eu Battlegroups and 
naTo response Force concepts would give way to the creation of a European brigade-
sized stand-by force for expeditionary operations, acting as the necessary complement 
to naTo’s Very High readiness Joint Task Force’s role in territorial defence. To sustain 
this, the Eu and naTo should also closely coordinate their respective capability 
development processes, for instance through a Framework nation Concept common to 
the two organisations. Such a ‘Brussels plus’13 partnership makes eminent sense: 
12 norway’s then Minister of European affairs, Vidar Helgesen was amongst the first to highlight the Eu’s 
new, critical and complementary role to naTo’s in collective security (Helgesen 2015).
13 The concept of a new ‘Brussels plus’ partnership was coined by General patrick de rousiers (2016) at a 
Dutch Eu presidency conference.
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whether made available for territorial defence, CSDp or naTo, European capabilities 
ultimately serve the same fundamental purpose, our collective security.
Conclusion
2016 is a year rife with existential threats for the union, but also one of significant 
opportunity—not least for European security and defence. The forthcoming Global 
Strategy and naTo’s warsaw Summit, together with the potential Eu Security and 
Defence ‘white book’ and Commission Defence action plan, offer an unparalleled stra-
tegic sequence.
it is no longer time for incremental steps in CSDp or national defence capabilities, but 
for thinking anew about the essential decisions that bind Europeans together. if Euro-
pean leaders can find the courage to step out of the ‘fog of peace’, technocratic bickering 
and the grip of history, they can deliver a step change in the collective capacity to 
ensure security for the citizens of Europe and the wider continent through the establish-
ment of a Security and Defence union.
will all 28 member states join or will the numbers be smaller? it is useless to pretend 
that this question does not exist. The possibility of moving forward in smaller groups of 
permanent structured cooperation—both outside and within the treaties—is there. who 
will be in and who will be out? ultimately that is up to the leaders and peoples of Europe 
to decide. But in security and defence, let us still believe that strength lies in numbers!
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons attribu-
tionLicense which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
originalauthor(s) and the source are credited.
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